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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH BUNKER HARDMAN, Admin-
istratrix of the Estate of Oswald 
C. Hardman, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GAINES EDWARD THURMAN and 
WOODROW W. DICKEY, doing 
business as Dickey Woody Prod-
uce Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 7609 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a statutory action for damages by reason 
of the death of Oswald C. Hardman on or about the 
29th day of October, 1949. On said date at about the 
hour of 9:00 or 9:30P.M. the plaintiff, Ruth Bunker 
Hardman, wife of the decedent, was driving his auto-
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mobile, in which decedent with their small child was 
also riding, south on State Street in Salt Lake City in 
the lane next to the center of the street. State Street 
north of 21st South has four lanes of paved highway ... 
and has a gra veiled surface east of the east lane wide 
enough for vehicular travel. South of 21st South 
State Street has six paved lanes. The speed limit on 
State Street south of 21st South is 40 miles per hour, 
and the speed limit north of 21st South is 35 miles per 
hour. As Mrs. Hardman entered the street intersection 
she turned left to go east on 21st South, and _when she 
had arrived at approximately the west line of the east 
lane of 21st South her car was struck by the truck of 
the defendant, causing the death of said Oswald C. 
Hardman. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff 
and this appeal is from the judgment entered on said 
verdict. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. Plaintiff negligent; defendants not negligent. 
2. The court erred in permitting witness Brady 
to testify as to· operation of brakes on truck and trailer 
based on assumed facts of which there was no evidence. 
(118) 
3. The court erred in permitting witness Swigart 
to give his expert opinion as to speed of truck ( 178, 
18 9) when there was no basis in the evidence for such 
testimo-ny. 
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4. The court erred in permitting Witness Peter-
son to give hearsay testimony as to qualifications of 
Oswald C. Hardman ( 19 9) . 
5. The court erred in denying defendants' mo-
tion for a directed verdict ( 2 9 0-2 91 ) . 
6. The court erred in refusing to give defendants' 
requested instructions: 
(a) In refusing to- direct a verdict fot 
defendants (Requested Ins. No. 1). 
(b) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 2 that 
if Thurman was not liable Dickey could not 
be held liable. 
(c) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 4 that 
plaintiff's negligence must be imputed to Os-
wald C. Hardman, deceased. 
(d) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 5 on 
the issues of contributory and imputed degni-
gence. 
(e) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 7 
which was a proper statement of the law appli-
cable to the facts under defendants' theory. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT NOT NEGLIGENT-PLAIN-
TIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF DEATH. 
There were only three eye-witnesses to the acci-
dent, Daniel Lauriente, a witness for the plaintiff, 
Wayne Parrish, the driver of a tanker, and Thurman, 
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the driver of the defendants' truck. Lauriente was 
talking to a friend at a point south of the intersection 
and on the west side of State Street and first saw the 
truck when it was 75 to 100 feet south of the inter-
section ( 1 0 3) and he estimated that its speed was 3 0 to 
3 5 miles per hour ( 9 5) . He states that when the truck 
entered the intersection the light was green and that 
the light was still gre·en at the time of the collision 
(97). 
Parrish testified that when the light turned green, 
he entered the intersection from the south in the lane 
next to the center and proceeded to about the center 
of the intersection with the purpose of making a left-
hand turn west in to 21st South as soon as traffic from 
the north had cleared, and while he was stopped, de-
fendants' truck came by him on the right at a speed 
of approximately 25 miles per hour when it struck the 
Hardman car (225). 
Thurman testified that he came into the street 
intersection in the second lane, to the right of the Par-
rish truck, at a speed not exceeding 20 miles per hour 
(236) and first saw the Hardman car when the front 
end of it was approximately in line with the front end 
of his truck (236). That he had no time or oppor-
tunity to turn either to the right or to the left to avoid 
striking the car; that he did all he could to stop his 
truck but was unable to do so and the truck struck the 
right door of the Hardman car (Ex. B). Mrs. Hard-
man testified that she never did see the truck at any 
time (219). 
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The evidence is that th.e trailer on the defendants' 
truck is 13 feet 2 inches in height (280); that there 
were the usual headlights on the truck itself and also 
lights on each corner of the trailer ( 2 3 8) . 
There is no dispute that when defendants' truck 
entered the street intersection the light was green ( 96, 
235, 23 7). It was green even at the time of the impact 
(97, 104) and the driver could not be guilty of negli-
gence unless he was exceeding the speed limit. There 
are no facts upon which the plaintiff can possibly 
invoke the doctrine of last clear chance because there 
is no evidence that the truck driver saw, or that by the 
exercise of reasonable care he should have seen, the 
plaintiffs car in time to avoid the collision. He 
did not see plaintiff's car until "it was right in front 
of me" (236). He had hardly time to get on the 
brakes (23 7). Defendants' negligence, therefore, if 
they were negligent, must depend on whether, just be-
fore and at the time of the impact, the truck was being 
driven at an excessive speed. 
What is plaintiff's proof as to the speed of the 
truck? The only evidence she offered was that of wit-
ness Swigart, physics professor at the University, who 
determined the speed by computation from certain as-
sumed facts. Those assumed facts were that the fric-
tion coefficient at 21st South and State Street was .83, 
determined by an experiment made by officer Yo·ung-
berg in an automobile with good brakes, by operating 
it at 35 miles an hour and applying the brakes violently 
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so as to lock the wheels. This experiment established 
the coefficient. Then, accepting this coefficient, Swi-
gart assumed in making his computation that the skid 
marks of the truck with all wheels locked were 76 feet 
in length, and therefore he computed the speed of the 
truck at 42.6 miles per hour. He testified, referring 
to his formula for the computation of the speed, that 
he would assume that all wheels slid ( 167, 168). He 
testified: 
"What I said, I would like to say, making 
the assumption that this vehicle is sliding on 
all wheels through this distance, the 126 feet 
given to me, we would have to subtract from 
that the length of the truck; I believe you can 
see why that is. If the wheels are suddenly 
braked the back wheels start to make skid 
marks back of the truck, and if we are having 
all wheels skid the final skid would not be 
from the front of the truck, not the entire mass, 
it would be the distance minus the length of 
the truck, 126 minus 50 would be 76 feet-
if that is assumed it is sliding-well I can work 
the problem using that figure or use any dis-
tance the figure might show.'' ( 17 8) 
Again: 
~'Now I want to be clearly understood 
when I make that calculation to make that 
statement, I have taken data on coefficient of 
friction .8 and I have made the assumption that 
the truck is sliding for a distance of 7 6 feet. I 
am not sa.ying that I know definitely his speed 
was this and again I figure in here from data 
I have not taken. In all from that understand-
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ing that will give a calculated speed of about 
42.6 miles per hour." ( 189) 
As he states he had not himself taken the data, he 
had assumed as correct data given him in the questions 
propounded and, he testified, his conclusions are no 
better than the data upon which they were based 
( 19 5). So we must ascertain whether th.e evidence 
shows that the truck wheels were locked and that the 
truck slid for 7 6 feet. 
Thurman, the truck driver, states that it was im-
possible to lock the wheels of the· truck and trailer when . 
loaded (243) and this truck was loaded when the acci-
dent happened (284, 289). 
· Clarence E. Brady, deputy sheriff, states that he 
held the tape while he and William M. Clark, Police 
Officer, made the only measurements that were made 
of any tire marks, and Brady says that the only mea-
surements made by Clark and himself were from the 
point of impact to where the Hardman car came to 
rest ( 115, 116). That that measurement was only of 
the mark left by the left front tire of the truck ( 113). 
He states that the trailer marks were the heaviest south 
of the point of impact and that Exhibit 2 shows these 
marks ( 125), but that he could not testify from the 
skid mark which he saw whether all the wheels of the 
unit were skidding from the farthest point south to 
where the truck came to rest ( 114, 115). He says he 
did not check the rear tractor wheels of the truck 
( 115). He didn't make any cl1eck of the tires to see 
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whether all had been slid ( 115, 116). That from the 
point of impa~t to where the Hardman car came to 
rest 
"we only measured one skid mark. That is the 
only one I recall. I never looked for any others. 
I didn't look for them and I certainly can't tes-
tify that I did. I only saw one skid mark. That 
is the one Officer· Clark and I measured. That 
is from the point of impact to where the car 
came to rest. The heaviest marks are up to 
that." ( 116) 
On cross-examination he testified: 
Again: 
· HQ. The only brake marks you observed 
at the time from the point of impact north to 
where the truck came to a stop was the one left 
by the left· front wheel? 
''A. That is correct. 
"Q. And if there was one by the right 
wheel you didn't see that? 
HA. I didn't see that." ( 119) 
I 
HQ. You say the trailer tire left some 
rather heavy marks? 
''A y . 
. es, str. 
~~Q. Can you describe those as to their 
width and color and density? 
~~A. No. sir. I was not the investigating 
officer. I was just holding the tape measuring 
the slide mark. I didn't investigate any mark, 
merely took measurements. I was just assist-
ing Officer Clark in his investigation." ( 121) 
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Officer Clark testified that the marks made by 
the truck commenced 57 feet south of the south curb 
of '21st South ( 131) and from that point to the point 
of impact was 81.7 feet (143). The truck was 50.3 
feet in length ( 144) which would give a distance of 
30.4 feet the truck traveled as shown by the marks 
until it struck the Hardman car ( 15 2). He testified 
that the brake marks did not show the same constant 
density. 
"They were a discoloration, that is .they 
weren't dark brake marks like you leave by 
skidding a car but there was a definite differ-
ence between those marks and the ·surface they 
covered or traveled over. 
"Q. You say they weren't a dark black 
mark like you usually see when you examine 
brake marks? 
"A. They were not a real dark black, no, 
. 
s1r. 
"Q. Will you state that brake marks leave 
a black mark on the surface? 
"A. That is my understanding." ( 149) 
He again stated that the marks he saw were not like 
the usual bla~,k. brake marks ( 154) ; that he did not see 
the brake ma~rks as they appeared on Exhibit No. 1 
(156); that the water marks as shown by the dark 
surface were quite distinct and that the dark marks 
shown on Exhibit 2 were made by water ( 157). 
The court will observe that Exhibits 1 and 2, 
which fairly represent the appearance of the highway 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
at the time ( 15 5), show no marks indicating a skid-
ding of the truck or trailer wheels when locked and the 
same may be said of Exhibit C. The fact is, as stated 
by Thurman, that he had no time to apply the brakes 
to make the truck and trailer skid, if it had been pos-
sible to do so (and he states that.was not). The con-
clusion is justified that as soon as he saw the Hardman 
car, he retarded his speed as much as possible but could 
not and did not lock the wheels and therefore left no 
skid marks; that his speed was so reduced that with 
'his heavy load he pushed the Hardman car only about 
45 feet (Ex. A). 
In view of this evidence what ;effect ~can be 
given to the testimony of expert Swigart as to the 
speed of the truck? He made his computation on the 
assumption that the wheels of the truck and trailer 
were locked and slid for a distance of 76 feet but there 
is no evidence to support such assumption so his testi-
mony was incompetent and without probative value. 
Assuming, then, as we must, that there is no competent 
evidence whatever that the truck was exceeding the 
speed limit when it entered or while crossing the street 
intersection, what basis can there be for any claim of 
negligence when it is undisputed that alf J the truck 
entered the street intersection o-n a green light and that 
after entering it his vision of the intersection was ob-
structed by the tanker which had stopped in th.e center, 
and by the car preceding in front and to the left of him 
in lane No.2 (260), so that he had no chance \vhat-
ever to avoid colliding with the Hardman car? If the 
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driver of the truck was at all times within his rights 
and did not in any particular violate any rule of the 
road, either by speed or otherwise, and if, as appears 
from the evidence, the plaintiff made a left turn across 
the lane of ttavel of the truck where she had no right 
to be, her negligence was the proximate cause of the 
fatality. 
It was plaintiff's duty when she intended to turn 
left to yield the right of \Vay to defendants' truck 
which was proceeding north on the green light. Yet 
she says she never saw the truck, which is conclusive 
proof that in making the left turn she did not keep a 
proper lookout for northbound traffic, for the truck 
was so close when it entered the intersection on the 
green light as to constitute an immediate hazard. The 
language used in French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., _____ _ 
Utah ________ , 216 Pac. (2d) 1002, should be controlling 
here. Justice La timer declared: 
"When a statute _prescribes that a turning 
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to another 
on a straight-of-way when the latter is close 
enough to constitute a hazard, it anticipates the 
exercise of reasonable judgment on the part of 
the driver turning. However, a burden is placed 
on the driver making the turn as he has control 
of the situation, and if there is a reasonable 
probability that the movement cannot be made 
in safety then the disfavored driver should yield. 
The driver proceeding straight ahead has little 
opportunity to know a vehicle is to be turned 
across his path until the movement is com-
menced and in many instances, the warning is 
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too late for the latter driver to take effective 
action. This is apparently what happened in 
this case. Plain tiff elected to run the risk of 
clearing ahead of the on-coming truck which 
was so close that even though it was moving 
at a reasonable rate of speed a collision could 
not be avoided. In so doing, he met with his 
mishap and his negligence contributed to his 
injury and prohibits his recovery.'' 
Plain tiff testified that she stopped after entering 
the intersection when the front of her car was halfway 
between the ·pedestrian lane and the semaphore (Tr. 
211-212) . While so stopped two or three cars pro-
ceeded north; one northbound signalled to turn left 
and stopped, then a tan car going north stopped imme-
diately east and parallel with the car which was sig .. 
nailing to go west (Tr. 212). Then it was, after hav-
ing waited for such disposition of the traffic, that 
plaintiff shifted into low and proceeded east at five 
miles per hour ( T r. 216) and, although she looked 
east and south sh.e never did see defendants' truck. She 
did not even see the semaphore light as she turned east 
(Tr. 217). She did not see the tanker driven by 
Wayne Parrish (Tr. 218) althqugh it was headed 
north in the inner lane and had stopped to make the 
turn west (Tr. 224) and she proceeded east into the 
far east lane of northbound traffic when, if she had 
been on the lookout traveling at only five miles per 
hour, she certainly would have observed the truck and 
its 13-foot high trailer and could have stopped in time 
to avoid being hit. How appropriate are the words of 
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Justice Wolfe in Ceder/off v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 
49-50, 169 Pac. (2d) 777, wherein the position of 
the parties was reversed: 
"If the jury found that defendant made 
the turn very slowly in accordance with his tes-
timony, then his negligence was the sole cause 
of the collision. Had the driver of plaintiff's car 
observed defendant slowly making the turn, in 
accordance with defendant's testimony, he 
would be justified in assuming that defendant 
had seen his approach and would stop, as the 
law required him to do, before entering the 
northbound traffic lane, and to allow plaintiff's 
car to pass. To drive in that manner would 
be an invitation to the driver of plaintiff's car 
to continue in his regular course and when de-
fendant continued to crawl into plaintiff's lane 
of traffic and failed to stop, as the law required 
him to do, it would be too late to avoid the 
accident by the time plaintiff's driver could dis-
cover that defendant was not going to stop. 
Thus, as a matter of law, defendant's negligence 
would be the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent." 
We submit that it affirmatively appears that the 
plaintiffs conduct in failing to keep a proper lookout 
and in failing to yield the right of way to the oncoming 
truck of defendant establishes beyond question that her 
negligence was the sole proximate caues of the accident, 
and her negligence must be imputed to her husband as 
he was the owner of the car and she was presumably 
driving it at his direction. 
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 Pac. (2) 
1049. 
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ERRORS IN RULINGS OF THE COURT 
1. The court erred in permitting witness Brady 
to testify as to operation of the brakes on the truck 
and trailer. 
Witness Brady was permitted to answer the fol-
lowing question: 
''Assuming that the evidence in this case 
then will show that the foot brake operates both 
the tractor and trailer wheels, then an air brake 
in proper functioning order would apply equal-
ly on all wheels, would it not?" ( 118) 
No foundation had been laid for such question 
and the answer was permitted on the basis that it 
would be connected with evidence later to be intro-
duced but which never was introduced. The evidence 
in fact showed that there were two sets of brakes-a 
foot brake for the truck and a hand brake for the 
trailer (24 3). 
2. The court erred in permitting witness Swigart 
to give his expert opinion as to th.e speed of defendants' 
truck ( 178-189). Witness Swigart testified that based 
upon a coefficient .8 and the skidding with all wheels 
o{ truck and trailer locked for a distance of 7 6 feet, 
the speed of the truck was 42.6 m.p.h. As we have 
heretofore shown, there was no evidence that all wheels 
of the truck and trailer were locked or that they, when 
so locked, skidded for 7(J ft. or at all (Tr. 187-188). 
3. The court erred in permitting witness Peter-
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son to answer questions as to discussions in directors 
meetings as to the qualifications of Oswald C. Hard-
man. This evidence was pure hearsay ( 19 9) . 
4. The court erred in denying defendants' Mo-
tion for a directed verdict for the reasons herein before 
set forth (a) that there was no evidence that defen-
dants were negligent; (b) that the evidence shows that 
plaintiff was negligent, that her negligence was the 
proximate cause of the accident and that her negligence 
was imputable to Oswald C. Hardman (290-291). 
ERRORS OF THE COURT IN REFUSING CER-
TAIN INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED 
BY DEFENDANTS 
1. Defendants' requested instruction No. 1, for 
a directed verdict (38) should have been given. There 
is no evidence upon- which the case should have gone 
to the jury. 
2. Requested instruction No. 2 (39) that if 
Thruman was not liable Dickey could not be liable, 
was also a correct statement of the law which defen-
dant was entitled to have given. 
3. Under the evidence and under the rule an-
nounced in Fox v. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 Pac (2d) 
1049, defendants were entitled to have their requested 
instruction No. 4 given, for obviously if decedent was 
negligent, no cause of action for his death arose, and 
as plaintiff's negligence was imputed to him, if she 
was negligent, then plaintiff could not recover. Plain-
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tiff offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that 
plaintiff was driving the car at decedent's direction. 
4. Requested instruction No. 5 ( 4 2) is a correct 
statement of the law of contributory negligence and is 
also applicable to the facts on the question of imputed 
negligence under Fox v. Lavender. 
5. What reason can possibly excuse the court 
for refusing to give requested instruction No. 7? ( 45) 
Certainly it was a correct statement of the law appli-
cable to the facts, in line with defendants' theory, and 
no other instruction was given covering the elements 
· embodied in it. 
6. Requested instruction No. 11 (51) is in ac-
cord with Sec. ~ 7-7-13 7, and defendants were entitled 
to an instruction that it was not sufficient for plain-
tiff to say that she looked and did not see what ob-
viously she must have seen if she had looked. Here 
came the truck with trailer 13 feet in height, with 
\lights on both. She was negligent if she failed to see 
.lw"hat she must have seen if she had looked, and her 
testimony was inherently erroneous because it was con-
trary to the physical facts. 2 0 Am. J ur., pp. 1 0 3 3-4. 
7. Requested instruction No. 12 (52) excluding 
from the jury's consideration the elements of deceased's 
suffering and the element of sympathy or mental dis-
tress of plaintiff, was a proper instruction. 
Corbett v. O.S.L.R.R.Co., 25 Ut. 449, 
71 Pac. 1065. 
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The only instruction touching this particular 
element is instruction No. 15 (70) which does not 
negative the consideration of the elements of mental 
suffering or sympathy. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should 
be reversed. There is exactly the same justification for 
protecting a defendant from damages when he is not 
liable as for awarding damages to the plaintiff when 
he is entitled to recover. 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
REX J. HANSON, 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR., 
Attorneys for Appellant .. 
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